In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.B. and C.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.B. and C.B.,

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0018
FILED 10-22-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD35379
The Honorable Gregory S. Como, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant Father

Elizabeth B., Peoria
Appellant Mother

Law Office of Ed Johnson, Phoenix
By Edward D. Johnson
Advisory Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Ingeet P. Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Appellees L.B. and C.B.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.B. and C.B.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Robert B. (“Father”) and Elizabeth B. (“Mother”) appeal the
superior court’s order terminating their parental rights to the two children
they share. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother gave birth to the parties’ first child, C.B., in April 2021.
The parties married a little over a year later.

¶3 The month after C.B. was born, the Department of Child
Safety (“DCS”) received a report that the police had been called to the
parties’ home after an altercation in which Mother resisted Father’s
attempts to forcibly take the baby from her arms, resulting in a physical
“tug-of-war” over her. After pulling C.B. from Mother’s arms, Father took
the baby from the home and went to a neighbor’s house. The Phoenix Police
Department conducted a welfare check at the neighbor’s house but took no
further action.

¶4 DCS filed a dependency petition in June 2021, alleging that
neither parent was able or willing to provide two-month-old C.B. with
proper and effective parental care “due to domestic violence and mental
health concerns.”

¶5 The juvenile court initially ordered that C.B. be left in
Mother’s care pending the dependency hearing, subject to a “safety plan”
that required Mother to live with her sister, C.B.’s maternal aunt M.V.
(“Aunt”). Within a week, however, Mother violated the safety plan by
leaving Aunt’s house with C.B. and returning to live with Father. The court
then ordered C.B. removed from Mother’s custody and placed in Aunt’s
care.

¶6 The juvenile court subsequently found C.B. dependent as to
Mother and Father. The initial case plan was family reunification, and DCS
offered Mother and Father services to help them remedy the circumstances

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that led to the child’s removal. Initially, DCS requested that both Mother
and Father undergo a psychological evaluation, referred them to Family
Connections and the Nurturing Parenting Program (“NPP”) for parenting
classes and coaching, and helped set up supervised visits with C.B.

¶7 As requested, both parents underwent psychological
evaluations. Father’s evaluation was conducted by Roger Martig, Ph.D.,
who determined that Father suffered from “trauma” resulting from the
time he spent in DCS custody as a child and from physical confrontations
he had with a stepparent during his teenage years. Dr. Martig concluded
that Father suffers from “depression and anxiety” which “may . . . be
related to” his “tendenc[y] to be . . . perhaps overly angry on occasion.”
Noting that Father “may lack insight into his own problems,” Dr. Martig
recommended that Father participate in “supportive therapy . . . combined
with cognitive behavioral therapy.”

¶8 Although Mother’s psychological evaluation is not in the
record, she later testified that she was diagnosed with “bipolar
schizophrenia.”

¶9 Over the next year, both parents participated in various
services. Father, for example, participated in individual therapy through
Neighborhood Outreach Access to Health (“NOAH”) to “address[] his
childhood trauma and how it relates to his parenting.” Additionally, both
parents participated in parenting classes and engaged in supervised visits
with C.B.

¶10 Despite their engagement in services, however, DCS observed
that “very little [sic] behavioral changes ha[d] occurred.” Father’s therapist
through NOAH “reported that [he] minimize[d] the on-going domestic
violence occurring between him and [Mother].” Multiple scheduled visits
were cut short or cancelled altogether because Father did not arrive on time.
Visitation supervisors reported that Father was “very difficult to work with,
and . . . quickly bec[a]me irate to staff.” His visitation was temporarily
suspended after an incident when he arrived for a visit with a marijuana
vape cartridge in his pocket and became “argumentative” with security
when told he could not bring it inside the facility.

¶11 Similarly, during supervised visits, Mother was observed
“looking” at “her phone” rather than “focus[ing] on [C.B.].” Further,
Mother’s NPP referral was closed after six weeks because the provider
determined she was “unable to comprehend, discuss, or focus during …
attempts to teach and complete” the parenting coursework and she failed
to complete home assignments, claiming to be “too busy.”

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¶12 During this same time, both parents struggled with
employment and housing stability. From the start of the dependency
proceedings in June 2021 until February 2023, Mother worked at various
restaurants and at what she later called “temp” jobs. In February 2023 she
obtained a job at a Denny’s restaurant working 30 hours per week; she held
that job for less than a year. A few months into the dependency, Father lost
his job at a pizza restaurant because, he claimed, he missed too much work
attending DCS appointments. In early 2022, he obtained a job at a different
pizza restaurant, but by early 2023 he was unemployed again. Meanwhile,
according to Mother, the two of them ”d[idn’t] have a place” and were
“staying with [Father’s] friend.”

¶13 In August 2022, Mother and Father had another child, L.B.
Due to the unresolved issues in C.B.’s dependency, DCS immediately filed
a dependency petition for L.B. Both parents pled no contest to the
allegations in the dependency petition, and L.B. was adjudicated dependent
and placed with Aunt.

¶14 Following the birth of L.B., both parents continued
participating in individual therapy. Father began weekly drug testing, often
testing positive for marijuana. Father’s supervised visitation was resumed,
and Father continued to exhibit concerning behavior. Visitation supervisors
reported that Father would “often yell.” Moreover, Father was resistant to
guidance. On one occasion, he left L.B. “alone on [a] couch” while the baby
was sleeping. When the case aide pointed out the safety risk to the baby,
Father “argue[d]” with the aide “instead of fixing the concern.” On another
occasion when changing L.B.’s diaper, Father wiped the baby’s genitals so
roughly that L.B. had to be taken to urgent care due to injuries to his penis
“that looked like rug [burn].”

¶15 Mother was re-referred to NPP. Although she successfully
completed the program this time, it was recommended that she be re-
referred another time because “she continue[d] to struggle greatly with
parenting the children[.]” Father was also referred to NPP and, after being
unsuccessfully closed out, was re-referred again.

¶16 In October 2022, Father and Mother requested couple’s
counseling through NOAH. Later that same week, however, police were
called to the parents’ home twice on the same day because Father and
Mother were engaged in heated arguments. The second time, Glendale
police officers arrested Mother for disorderly conduct. When NOAH called
the following day to schedule their initial couple’s counseling session,
Father informed them that Mother “went to jail last night” and that couple’s

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counseling was “no longer need[ed]” because he intended to “get[] an
annulment.”

¶17 In July 2023, Father underwent another psychological
evaluation, this time by Nicole Mirkin, PsyD. After reviewing records,
interviewing Father, and administering certain tests, Dr. Mirkin found
cause for concern in Father’s “recurring aggression and reluctance to
change.” Specifically, she determined that Father’s “limited” progress and
“his consistent denial of inappropriate actions[,] coupled with aggressive
behavior,” including “raising his voice” and “name-calling,” “creates an
unsafe environment for the children and hampers positive change.” Dr.
Mirkin opined that Father’s prognosis for being “able to demonstrate” even
“minimally adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future” was
“unfavorable[.]”

¶18 In August 2023, the court, at DCS’s request, ordered that the
parents be enrolled in the Cradle 2 Crayons (“C2C”) program, a parenting
services program operated by the superior court rather than DCS.

¶19 Father and Mother began participating in services through
the C2C program in September 2023. They participated, for example, in
“Family Time Coaching,” a service that provides parenting coaches to
parents during four-hour supervised visits. Likewise, they were enrolled in
the “Circle of Security” program, which offers a curriculum to help parents
better understand the needs of their children. Father also received
individual trauma therapy, and Mother received child-parent
psychotherapy to strengthen her bond with L.B.

¶20 In October 2023, counsel for the children moved to change the
case plan from family reunification to severance and adoption. After an
evidentiary hearing in December 2023, the court denied the request,
determining that although the parents were “certainly not ready to have the
children returned to them,” terminating the relationship would be
“premature.”

¶21 The parents continued to participate in C2C programs, and
the C2C providers reported that both parents made progress addressing
some areas of concern. Father, for instance, became better able to recognize
when he was becoming “upset,” and would leave the visitation room for a
five-minute break to calm himself. Mother, for her part, exhibited greater
patience and affection with the children. The parents did not, however,
meet all of their goals necessary to be considered safe and effective parents.
On one occasion, for example, a parenting coach observed Father “holding
[C.B.] a little tightly” when the child resisted being put down for a nap.

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¶22 Meanwhile, both parents continued to be unable to maintain
consistent employment. After a period of unemployment, Mother obtained
a job in April 2024 working one day a week at a pizza restaurant. By the
middle of the following month, however, she was unemployed again.
Father worked a string of part-time fast-food jobs, which were punctuated
by periods of unemployment.

¶23 The parents likewise were unable to maintain stable housing.
In early 2024, after residing in a room at a Budget Suites of America motel
at the maternal grandfather’s expense, Father and Mother moved into a
trailer owned by the maternal grandfather. Although the maternal
grandfather expected them to pay rent each month, they did not
consistently do so. As the maternal grandfather later testified, they lived in
the trailer for six or seven months, but only paid rent for two. When, he
further testified, he finally told them to vacate the premises in May 2024,
Father “got upset” and began “screaming” at him and “cussing [him] out.”
Father then threw a lawn chair and went into the trailer and punched the
refrigerator, breaking his hand. Alarmed at Father’s reaction, the maternal
grandfather called the police, then later sought legal assistance to have a
notice of eviction prepared and served.

¶24 Upon being evicted, Father and Mother asked J.L., a neighbor
in the trailer park, if “they could stay a night.” J.L. agreed. As he later
testified, however, Father and Mother did not depart the following day, but
proceeded “to make themselves . . . at home” in his trailer without paying
rent. J.L. further testified that, during the time that Father and Mother lived
with him, Father “was angry all the time.” At times, J.L. said, Father would
“flip out and call [Mother] a bitch or a whore.” At other times, he went on,
Father would “beat[]” and “punch[]” his dog.

¶25 In August 2024, counsel for the children again requested a
change in case plan to severance and adoption. Counsel for the children
expressed concern that despite the parents’ engagement with services, they
were still not ready to parent the children full-time. Counsel also pointed
out that the parents admitted that their current living situation was
unsuitable for children, and that Father had not provided proof of
employment despite repeated requests. Over the parents’ objections, the
court granted the request and changed the case plan to severance and
adoption. Counsel for the children then moved to terminate Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶26 After the case plan changed, J.L. overheard Father tell Mother
that “he was going to blow up” the DCS building, “kill the kids’ lawyer”

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and “the judge that takes his kids away,” and then “take his kids and . . .
run from the country.”

¶27 J.L.’s mother, who owned the trailer in which J.L. lived, told
Father and Mother to move out. Father responded by becoming “verbally
abusive” to her and then “ripp[ing] the shower head off the wall.” J.L. called
the police, and later he and his mother sought and obtained an injunction
against harassment against Father.

¶28 After Father and Mother were required to move out of J.L.’s
trailer, Mother moved in with her father. Although Father apologized for
his May 2024 outburst and asked if he could move in, too, the maternal
grandfather refused.

¶29 A termination trial was set for late December 2024. About a
month or so before trial, DCS learned of the threat that J.L. heard Father
make against DCS and court personnel. After an evidentiary hearing at
which J.L. testified, the court found him “quite credible” and determined
that Father’s threats of violence warranted the suspension of Father’s
visitation and other in-person services. The court also allowed DCS
representatives to testify virtually at the upcoming trial due to the threats
made specifically against them by Father.

¶30 The five-day termination trial began in late December 2024.
At the trial, counsel for C.B. and L.B. called DCS case manager Courtney
Small and the children’s maternal grandfather as witnesses. Small, who had
been the case manager since mid-2022, gave an extensive overview of DCS’s
involvement in the case, the parents’ involvement with services, and the
parents’ progress (or lack thereof) towards remedying barriers to
reunification. Small testified, for example, that Father “is not able to control
himself” under stress and, instead, “continues” to exhibit “emotional
outbursts” and “dysregulation.” Additionally, she stated, Father has not
demonstrated stability in housing or employment. Over the course of the
case, for example, he held multiple jobs at different fast-food restaurants.

¶31 Small further testified that the children are bonded with Aunt
and her husband, that the children’s needs are being met, and that Aunt
and her husband want to adopt them.

¶32 The maternal grandfather testified about the financial support
he had provided Father and Mother, their occupancy of his trailer, and
Father’s violent reaction when told to move out. He further testified that he
will not allow Father into his home because Father “transforms into a
different person” when he becomes angry. When asked if he would be

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concerned for the well-being of C.B. and L.B. if they were returned to
Father’s custody, the maternal grandfather replied, “I cannot imagine my
grandkids being with [him] for a week or a day.” He also stated that
although Mother was “trying as much as she can,” he did not believe that
she was “100 percent ready [to] get the kids with her.”

¶33 The court also took judicial notice of J.L.’s testimony at the
evidentiary hearing about Father’s threats against DCS and court personnel
and about Father’s use of vulgar and insulting language when speaking
with Mother.

¶34 Mother testified on her own behalf, stating that she has
successfully addressed her mental health issues through medication and
therapy and that she has obtained stable employment at a store working
about 25 hours per week.

¶35 Mother also called child-parent psychotherapist, Sydnie
Saunders, to testify. Saunders testified that she provided therapy to Mother
and L.B. to “strengthen[] the attachment relationship,” and that, in her
opinion, Mother’s ability to understand L.B.’s emotional and physical needs
improved. Saunders acknowledged, however, that her observations were
limited to ”the hour a week” that she spends with Mother and L.B., and she
couldn’t opine on Mother’s ability to parent outside a clinical setting.

¶36 Mother also called C2C’s clinical director, Nicole Roskens, to
testify. Roskens testified that both parents exhibited improved parenting
skills during their weekly four-hour coaching sessions. She acknowledged
that Father attended only 14 of the 24 scheduled therapy sessions, but
nonetheless believed that he “was making progress” with his “reactions” to
stress. Roskens explained that when Father found himself “getting
stressed” during his visitation sessions, he would “ask to take a break” so
he could leave the room for five minutes to calm himself. Roskens
acknowledged, however, that parenting a child during supervised visits “in
a controlled setting” with the “constant support” of a parenting coach is
“not at all similar” to parenting a child on a full-time basis at home without
“therapists on standby.” She also acknowledged that a parent’s display of
“extreme anger” can have “negative effects” on young children.1

¶37 Father testified on his own behalf. He stated that he found the
C2C programs and therapy helpful, and believed he had “made a lot of

1 Because Roskens testified that she did not have safety concerns regarding

Father, the court reinstated Father’s ability to receive C2C services in
person.

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strides” in mastering his anger issues. He further testified that he and the
children have a loving relationship and that he was “ready” to parent them.

¶38 Father denied making the threats to which J.L. had testified
and, although he admitted having an altercation with the maternal
grandfather in May 2024, he blamed it on the maternal grandfather.
According to Father, the maternal grandfather instigated the altercation by
“cussing at me” and “hitting me with his cane.” He admitted throwing a
lawn chair during this incident, but insisted he did not throw it in the
maternal grandfather’s direction. He further admitted punching the
refrigerator and breaking his hand, but appeared to suggest that it was an
accident. “[I]n the heat of the moment,” he stated, “I swung in the air and I
ended up hitting my fridge.”

¶39 Father admitted that he lacked stable housing during the
dependency, but asserted that he remedied that issue by leasing an
apartment with Mother “a couple of weeks” earlier. He further testified that
he worked part-time at a pizza restaurant and was about to start a new job
“making $15 an hour” cleaning airplanes at the airport “30 hours a week,
possibly.” He admitted, however, that he had not yet passed the
background check required by his new employer. He acknowledged that
he had not maintained stable employment during the dependency
proceedings, but blamed his repeated job losses on DCS, asserting that the
obligations that DCS imposed on him occupied so much of his time that his
availability to work was unduly limited.

¶40 On further questioning, Father admitted that he had lost jobs
during the dependency proceedings through no fault of DCS’s. He testified,
for example, that he lost his job at a KFC restaurant because he was unable
to work because he was recovering from surgery on the hand he broke
when he punched the refrigerator. When asked, “[D]id DCS make you
punch that fridge?”, he admitted, “No.” He further admitted that he lost his
previous job at Denny’s not because of DCS, but because he “didn’t get
along” with the manager.

¶41 The juvenile court issued its ruling in February 2025
terminating the parental rights of both Father and Mother. The court
acknowledged that Mother had remedied concerns about her mental
health, and that “domestic violence does not appear to present” a
continuing “barrier to reunification.” The court further found, however,
that the parents had not remedied other barriers to reunification, including
Father’s anger issues, their unsafe parenting practices, and their financial
instability. The court determined statutory grounds for termination under

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A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) — 15 months’ out-of-home placement — was
established and that the termination was in the children’s best interests.

¶42 Both parents timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶43 While parents have a fundamental right to the custody and
control of their children, that right is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). The parental relationship may
be terminated if the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
at least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and
further finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the
child’s best interests. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶
13 (2022) (citations omitted). When reviewing an order terminating parental
rights, we view evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
juvenile court’s findings. Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205,
207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). We will affirm a termination order
absent an abuse of discretion. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207
Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶44 Both Mother and Father submitted opening briefs in this case.
However, Mother’s “brief” is a short, handwritten letter asserting that she
“deserve[s] a second chance” because she has been “keeping up with [her]
medications” and “taking classes to better [her]self.”

¶45 “Opening briefs must present significant arguments,
supported by authority, setting forth the appellant’s position on the issues
raised[,]” otherwise the issues are waived. MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz.
584, 591, ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). Mother’s brief simply fails to
develop any issue adequately for us to review. We therefore consider her
arguments waived and proceed to the issues raised in Father’s brief.

¶46 To terminate parental rights on 15-months’ out-of-home
placement grounds, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires the court to find that (1)
the child has been in “an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total
period of fifteen months or longer,” (2) DCS “made a diligent effort to
provide appropriate reunification services,” (3) the parent has been “unable
to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home
placement,” and (4) there is a “substantial likelihood that the parent will
not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control
in the near future.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). In its ruling, the court found that
counsel for the children had established all four prongs. Father challenges

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the court’s findings on only the last two prongs, i.e., that the parents were
unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the children’s out-of-home
placement and that there was a substantial likelihood that they would not
be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in
the near future. Id. We therefore affirm, as unchallenged, the court’s
findings that C.B. and L.B. were in an out-of-home placement for longer
than fifteen months and that DCS made a diligent effort to provide
appropriate reunification services. See Crystal E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
241 Ariz. 576, 577-78, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (affirming juvenile court’s
unchallenged findings of grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(c)).

¶47 The court also found that termination would be in the
children’s best interests. Father does not challenge this finding, which we
also affirm. See id.

A. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the parents were unable to remedy circumstances that
caused the children’s out-of-home placement.

¶48 In finding that the parents had not remedied the
circumstances that led to the children’s out-of-home placement, the court
identified three circumstances that “continue[d] to present barriers to
reunification.” First, the court found, Father’s “emotional instability and
anger presents a safety risk to the children.” The court found, second, that
both parents have struggled to follow “basic safe parenting practices,” and,
third, that the parents have been unable to maintain stable housing and
employment. Challenging these findings, Father maintains the court failed
to cite specific evidence to support them and failed to give sufficient weight
to evidence of “how much progress” he made during the dependency.

¶49 A review of the record shows that abundant evidence
supports the juvenile court’s findings. As the court pointed out, several
incidents in 2024 alone showed Father had not overcome his anger
management issues. Twice in mid-2024, Father was directed to move out of
the place where he was residing; both times, he reacted with physical
violence. Father broke his own hand punching a refrigerator, an injury that
required surgery and resulted in the loss of his job when he was unable to
work while recuperating. Father later threatened violence after the case
plan was changed to severance and adoption. These incidents, which
occurred only months before trial began, support the court’s finding
regarding Father’s lack of sufficient progress in addressing his anger issues.

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¶50 The court acknowledged that Roskens opined Father had
made progress in avoiding dysregulation in times of stress. The court gave
limited weight to this testimony, however, because the court doubted that
Father’s improved ability to keep calm during “supervised” visitation
sessions “in a highly controlled . . . environment” established that he would
be similarly able to avoid dysregulation when engaged in “the daily task of
parenting two young children.” As the court noted, participating in weekly
four-hour “coaching sessions” is “not the same as 24/7 parenting.” While
Father evidently believes that the court accorded insufficient weight to
Roskens’s testimony about Father’s progress in controlling his anger, it is
not for this court to re-weigh the evidence. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8
(“[T]his court will not reweigh the evidence but will look only to determine
if there is evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.” (citation omitted)).

¶51 The court’s findings about Father’s inability to follow safe
parenting practices are supported by evidence that a parenting coach
observed Father “holding [C.B.] a little tightly” when she resisted going
down for her nap, and by evidence that Father was so rough with L.B.
during a diaper change that the child required medical treatment.

¶52 The court’s findings about the parents’ ongoing financial
instability are supported by evidence that their housing arrangements
changed multiple times over the course of the dependency proceedings. In
2024 alone, Father and Mother lived at a Budget Suites, then in a trailer
owned by the maternal grandfather, then in a trailer with J.L. After they
were evicted from the second trailer, Mother returned to live with her
father, but Father was not allowed to join her. Further, the parents did not
demonstrate an ability to pay their monthly living expenses. The maternal
grandfather paid for their stay at the Budget Suites. Later, the parents paid
rent to the maternal grandfather for only two of the six or seven months
they lived in his trailer, and, as J.L. testified, they paid no rent at all after
moving in with him. Father’s employment was similarly unstable; he
admitted that he obtained and lost multiple jobs over the course of the
dependency.

¶53 Father argues that the juvenile court’s findings of the parents’
employment and housing instability ignored their “actual circumstances at
the time of trial.” At the time of trial, Father asserts, the parents “had been
in an apartment for a month with no plans to leave,” and he had one job
and “would be starting [another] soon.”

¶54 In view of Father’s frequent changes of residence, his
testimony that he moved into a new apartment a week or two earlier, even
accepted as true, hardly demonstrates housing stability. And although

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Father testified at trial that he was currently employed part-time at a pizza
restaurant and expected to start a second part-time job cleaning airplanes
at the airport, he admitted he had not yet passed the background check
needed to begin the second job. Moreover, he testified that he did not intend
to keep both jobs; if the children were returned to his care, he said, he would
have to quit one of the jobs to be available to care for them. Father’s
testimony did not, in other words, establish that he had achieved financial
stability through steady, full-time employment.

¶55 Father’s persistent violent outbursts, his unsafe parenting
behaviors, and his ongoing failure to demonstrate an ability to maintain
stable housing and steady employment constitutes sufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that he did not remedy the concerns
that led to the children’s out-of-home placement.

B. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding a
substantial likelihood that the parents would not be capable
of exercising proper and effective parental care and control
in the near future.

¶56 Father also argues that the juvenile court did not make the
required findings about his likelihood of being able to parent in the near
future, but merely “rehashed” its already-stated concerns about his past
behavior without “acknowledg[ing]” the positive progress he made.

¶57 A review of the juvenile court’s lengthy and detailed ruling
shows that the court gave careful consideration not only to the
circumstances giving rise to the dependency, but to whether Father would
be able to remedy them in the near future. The court acknowledged that the
parents had “made some progress,” but found their progress too little and
too slow in view of the 3½-year duration of the dependency, which
encompassed all of L.B.’s life and all but two months of C.B.’s. Such a
finding is consistent with that made by courts in similar circumstances. See,
e.g., In re A.M., CA-JV 24-0043, 2025 WL 1079219 at *4, ¶ 25 (Ariz. App. Apr.
10, 2025) (mem. decision) (juvenile court’s finding that the child “had been
in an out-of-home placement since birth, a period of nearly three years,”
was a factor in support of termination on 15-months’ ground); Keilynn K. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, CA-JV 2015-0051, 2015 WL 5120703 at *6, ¶ 19 (Ariz.
App. Aug. 31, 2015) (mem. decision) (evidence that mother took three years
“to even make minimal progress” supported juvenile court’s findings that
Mother was unlikely to be able to parent in the near future).

¶58 The court further noted that the progress the parents made
had been in “highly controlled and supervised” environments; the court

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.B. and C.B.
Decision of the Court
expressed doubt that the progress would continue if they resumed “24/7
parenting.” As the court observed, parenting a baby and a toddler for a few
hours a week in the presence of a parenting coach, with the option of taking
five-minute breaks in moments of stress, is wholly unlike parenting them
on a full-time basis without professional support. Further, Father’s
testimony at the termination trial — in which he blamed DCS for his
recurring job losses and the maternal grandfather for the altercation in
which Father broke his hand — demonstrates his continued refusal to
accept responsibility for his own actions. As Dr. Mirkin opined, Father’s
“consistent denial of inappropriate actions” will “hamper[]” his ability to
make “positive change” in the future. Dr. Mirkin’s report supports the
court’s determination that a substantial likelihood existed that he would be
unable to properly parent the children in the near future.

¶59 Father has failed to establish that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in determining that the limited positive behavioral changes that
he made over the course of 3½ years were insufficient to justify denying
permanency to C.B. and L.B. See Jacklyn D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, CA-JV 18-
0156, 2018 WL 6615155 at *3, ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. Dec. 18, 2018) (mem. decision)
(finding that Mother’s “lack of progress” over three-and-a-half-year
dependency supported juvenile court’s finding that Mother was unlikely to
be able to parent in the near future); cf. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240
Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (“[C]hildren should not be forced to wait
for their parent to grow up.” (citation omitted)). The juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in finding grounds for termination.

CONCLUSION

¶60 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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